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3As EU institutions have expanded their competences 
into areas directly a!ecting national sovereignty, so have 
concerns over its alleged ‘democratic de"cit’ deepened. 
#e Eurozone crisis has arguably taken these concerns to 
a new level, given that most policy responses to date have 
privileged executive decisions over parliamentary scrutiny, 
technocratic solutions over democratic accountability. 
#e crisis has thereby also contributed to rising public 
disillusionment with established political systems at all 
levels. Historically, economic downturns may always have 
a!ected public con"dence – but is the Eurozone crisis 
eroding trust in the Union in an unprecedented manner? 
And, if so, is political union the source of the problem or 
its solution?
#ese questions provided the starting point of a half day 
conference held at UCL in June 2013 and supported by 
the European Commission Representation in the UK, 
at which the papers collected here where "rst aired.1 
#e conference consisted of two panels. #e papers by 
Walton, Cheneval, Eleftheriadis and Nicolaïdis relate 
to the "rst, which focused on the democratic de"cit; 
those by Guérot and Van Parijs relate to the second, 
which dealt primarily with social justice. However, the 
themes are interconnected. On the one hand, a common 
criticism in the wake of the Eurocrisis has been that it has 
underscored how the failure to link monetary union to 
greater political union constituted a key weakness of the 
scheme. As a result, it is claimed that measures to address 
the sovereign debt crisis a$icting certain member states 
have been both ine!ective and illegitimate, compounding 
the already existing democratic de"cit. #ey are said to 
have involved the imposition of austerity programmes by 
creditor states on debtor states, with these policies agreed 
and implemented outside the usual EU and domestic 
democratic decision-making mechanisms. On the other 
hand, the crisis has created social problems across the EU, 
with 12% of the European labour force without a job 
and youth unemployment (relating to 16-24 year olds) in 
particular reaching unprecedented levels. 24.4%, or some 
3.58 million, of under 25 year olds are unemployed in 
Europe, and over 50% in Greece and Spain.2 It has been 
argued that social justice not only requires but also justi"es 
a more solidaristic approach between the member states to 
tackle this problem – an approach that again would only 
be feasible and legitimate within the context of a political 
union that enjoyed a more direct democratic mandate.
1 For details and a podcast of the first panel, see http://www.ucl.ac.uk/
european-institute/events/2012-13/eurozone
2 Figures from http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/nov/29/
eurozone-youth-unemployment-record-high-under-25sover
As at the original conference, the papers included here 
o!er a variety of views on both these issues. Some of the 
contributors - Walton, Guérot and Van Parijs - accept the 
proposition that greater political unity within the EU is 
both a practical necessity and a moral obligation if the 
Eurocrisis is to be tackled in a way that meets the joint 
requirements of justice and democracy, although they 
di!er as to what the balance between these two normative 
principles needs to be. By contrast, the other contributors 
– Cheneval, Eleftheriadis and Nicolaïdis - fear that such 
a move risks compounding the "nancial with a political 
crisis. Not only are the economic disparities between 
the states in the Eurozone such as to make a common 
currency di%cult to manage, but also the political cultures 
and identi"cations of European citizens are similarly too 
disparate to allow for an e!ective common democratic 
system. Yet, just as those who advocate greater political 
unity would not deny the diversity of the EU and in 
many aspects, as with its di!erent languages, would seek 
to celebrate it; so those who emphasise the political and 
economic salience of this diversity do not deny the need for 
cooperation to resolve common problems or that mutual 
recognition implies a degree of social solidarity.
As a result, the arguments presented here go beyond the 
rather sterile and counter-productive characterisation of 
every debate about the EU as one where all pro-Europeans 
must perforce desire more political union, with those who 
want a more politically di!erentiated EU being dubbed 
anti-Europeans and accused of seeking a return to a 
Europe of separate and mutually suspicious states. #is 
is a debate between di!erent visions of how the EU can 
be best organised in a democratic and socially just way 
that takes into account both the common problems that 
re&ect the interdependence of European citizens and the 
many di!erences among European peoples. As in domestic 
politics, so in European politics profound disagreements over 
policy need not imply that one side is more committed to 
co-existence within a common political framework than the 
other – separatism being by and large is the exception rather 
than the rule – merely that all sides have di!erent views of 
how that framework should be structured and run so as to 
best support the interests of its members.
Writing now in a purely personal capacity, I have tended to 
favour the second of the two views presented above.  
In common with Cheneval and Nicolaides, I regard the  
EU as best conceived as a ‘demoi-cracy’ rather than a 
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4‘demos-cracy’. As Philppe van Parijs, who adopts the 
contrary view, acknowledges, most European citizens are 
not mobile. Only 2 % of European citizens living in the 
EU reside in a di!erent country to that of their nationality, 
while over 70% of French nationals, for example, live 
within 10 km of their place of birth. Within almost all the 
member states there are demands for the greater devolution 
of power to minority national groups. #ere is nothing like 
the same popular support for a shift of political power to 
supranational institutions. 
EU o%cials have a tendency to dismiss such political realities 
too readily. For example, the President of the European 
Council, Herman von Rompuy, when asked his opinion 
on what was then only a proposed referendum on Scottish 
independence, remarked that: 
nobody has anything to gain from separatism in the world 
of today which, whether one likes it or not, is globalised 
… We have so many important challenges to take and we 
will only succeed if we can pool forces, join action, take 
common directions. #e global "nancial crisis is hitting us 
hard. Climate change is threatening the planet. How can 
separatism help? #e word of the future is union.3
Yet, those advocating Scottish national self-determination 
remain committed to cooperation with both the rest of the 
UK and the EU. True, just as those who support greater 
political union tend not to have fully thought through how 
that can be reconciled with their oft professed simultaneous 
commitment to diversity, so the supporters of national 
independence often fail to think through its implications 
and compatibility with the increasing inter-dependence 
of national economies and societies. However, if they are 
consistent in their thinking, then in demanding greater self-
determination for themselves they should endeavor to ensure 
it remains a possibility for others as well.
 Here we return to the issues of democracy and 
social justice and the role of the EU in their maintenance 
and development, but this time from a demoi-cratic 
rather than a demos-cratic perspective. One of the key, if 
insu%ciently lauded, achievements of the EU has been 
the encouragement and stabilization of democracy across 
Europe. #e majority of EU member states have experienced 
authoritarian rule within the past 100 years, many within 
the past 50 years. Membership of the EU has provided both 
an incentive and support for change. #at has been achieved 
not by merging all member states into a single democracy 
but through requiring they democratize su%ciently to be 
3 Herman von Rompuy, speaking in an interview of June 2011, as 
reported in The Guardian 4 November 2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/
politics/2012/nov/08/alex-salmond-scotland-independence
quali"ed to play an equal part in collective demoi-cratic 
decision making that involves governments, national 
parliaments, the Commission, civil society organisiations 
as well as the European Parliament, itself elected largely on 
the basis of national rather than European constituencies 
and party groupings. Agreements involving governments, 
o%cials, MEPs and other politicians within the EU’s 
complex political system can only be democratically 
legitimate to the extent they are both representative of the 
people whose interests they claim to serve and respect the 
equal rights of other peoples to be represented in ways that 
re&ect the equal rights of their citizens.4 Likewise, in the 
economic sphere the logic of structural funding has been to 
level up the capacity of the member states to compete on 
equal terms within the context of a single market. However, 
that has not meant that states cannot adopt di!erent if 
mutually responsive economic policies. In other words, 
here too the aim has been the demoi-cratic rather than the 
demos-cratic one of seeking to enhance the capacity and 
integrity of national decision-making in a context where the 
democratically endorsed policies of one state can generate 
negative externalities and undercut the democratically 
endorsed policies of another state. 
#e EU rightly insists that every member state should 
recognize its responsibility for maintaining the democratic 
integrity of each of the other states. #at obligation seems 
more important than ever in the current crisis. Yet, I 
would suggest it is undermined rather than promoted by 
policies that urge ever more union into a single European 
people rather than an ever closer union of peoples.5 As this 
collection shows, there are two sides to this debate, with the 
second as normatively attractive as and, in my view, more 
empirically feasible than, the "rst.6
4 For a discussion of the EU’s representative system from this point of 
view, see Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, ` Three Models of 
Democracy, Political Community and Representation in the EU`, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 20.2 (2013), pp. 206-223 and  Richard 
Bellamy and Sandra Kröger, `Representation Surpluses and Deficits in 
EU Policy-Making’, Journal of European Integration, 35: 5 (2013), pp. 
477-97.
5 For a fuller defense of this argument, see Richard Bellamy, `An Ever 
Closer Union of Peoples: Republican Intergovernmentalism, Demoi-
cracy and Representation in the EU’, Journal of European Integration, 
35: 5 (2013), pp. 499-516. 
6 The argument presented in this brief introduction relates to research 
funded by a Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship RF-2012-368 on 
‘A Republic of European States’ and was written while a Fellow at the 
Hanse Wissenschaft Kolleg in Delmenhorst.
5In their statement ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union’  the President of the European Council 
joined by the President of the European Parliament, the 
Commission and the Central Bank declared on 5 December 
2012 that monetary union requires serious reform, which 
includes strengthening its democratic credentials:
‘#e creation of a new "scal capacity for the EMU should 
also lead to adequate arrangements ensuring its full 
democratic legitimacy and accountability. #e details of 
such arrangements would largely depend on its speci"c 
features, including its funding sources, its decision-making 
processes and the scope of its activities.... #e openness 
and transparency of the process as well as the outcome are 
crucial to move towards a genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union.’1    
Democracy, or ‘full democratic accountability’, is on the 
agenda. But what do these ideas mean? Here we face some 
important di%culties. 
Democracy is a virtue of states, not of international entities. 
One of the most distinguished and sophisticated scholars 
of democracy, Robert Dahl, has persuasively argued a 
democracy exists when a political association provides 
equal participation in decisions about its policies. Respect 
for democracy requires, for Dahl, a number of substantive 
or qualitative standards, which he lists as: ‘e!ective 
participation’, ‘voting equality’, ‘enlightened understanding’, 
‘control of the agenda’, and ‘inclusion of adults’.2 Democracy 
is not just a decision procedure. International entities in 
general and the European Union in particular cannot meet 
these standards. #ey cannot o!er the same opportunities 
for political participation, in&uence and control o!ered by 
the domestic political context.3 Even those who argue for the 
creation of a supranational democracy in a federal European 
Union agree too, at least implicitly, with the premise that 
the EU cannot be a democracy, until it su%ciently resembles 
a state. Jürgen Habermas latest book proposes supranational 
democracy only after we somehow create a ‘cosmopolitan 
community’.4 
Such theoretical views create a problem for the plan 
outlined by the Four Presidents. How can we expect that the 
European Union can be more democratic, without at the 
1 Four Presidents Report, ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union’, 5 December 2012, p. 17. 
2 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 2000) 37-38.
3 Dahl, On Democracy, 115.
4 For example Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A 
Response (Cambridge: Polity, 2012).
same time promoting a full political union that would make 
the European Union resemble a domestic constitutional 
order? #is is then the theoretical and policy challenge 
that we now face: can the European Union ever be truly 
democratic?   
DEMOCRACY: COLLECTIVE AND EGALITARIAN
Much of the present puzzles about democracy in the 
European Union stem from a failure to distinguish 
between three competing theories of democracy. #e "rst 
theory believes democracy to be an ideal of collective 
empowerment. #e second considers it to be a principle 
of a fair procedure. #e third argues for democracy as a 
substantive ideal of equality. 
 
#e Collective #eory 
#e theory of democracy as collective empowerment believes 
in the self-government of a sovereign people. #e theory 
starts from common assumptions about the paramount 
value of popular sovereignty and builds an argument about 
collective will formation. In its purest form the theory was 
expressed by the German constitutional lawyer Carl Schmitt 
for whom democracy was the method for giving voice to 
the people’s will. I will quote in at length because it informs 
some constitutional theory in Europe even today:  
‘#e people are anterior to and above the constitution.  
Under democracy, the people are the subject of the 
constitution-making power. #e democratic understanding 
sees every constitution, even the Rechtstaat component, 
as resting on the concrete political decision of the people 
capable of political action.  Every democratic constitution 
presupposes such a people capable of action’.5
Schmitt goes on to argue for the unusual position that 
democracy is beyond constitutionalism. He asserts that: 
‘under the democratic theory of the people’s constitution-
making power, the people stand as the bearer of the 
constitution-making power outside of and above any 
constitutional norm’.6 #is position made Schmitt, 
surprisingly perhaps, critical of the modern methods of 
voting by secret ballots because he took democracy to be ‘the 
5 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, trans. by Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2008) 268. For constitutional theory that is 
influenced by Schmitt’s view of ‘popular sovereignty’ see for example 
Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker, ‘Introduction’ in Loughlin and Walker 
(eds.), The Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 1. I disucss some of the problems of this view in Pavlos 
Eleftheriadis, ‘Law and Sovereignty’ 29 Law and Philosophy (2010) 535.
6 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory 271.
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR A MONETARY UNION
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6rule of public opinion’ which went well beyond any formal 
manifestation, by way of election or any other procedure.7  
Surprisingly, perhaps, a parallel position is taken by the 
German Constitutional Court’s reasoning in cases regarding 
the European Union.8  In its Maastricht judgment it has said 
that democracy requires a strong and cohesive people, so as 
to be able to successfully express itself. #e court said: 
‘If the peoples of the individual States provide democratic 
legitimation through the agency of their national 
parliaments (as at present) limits are then set by virtue of 
the democratic principle to the extension of the European 
Communities’ functions and powers. Each of the peoples 
of the individual States is the starting point for a state 
power relating to that people. #e States need su%ciently 
important spheres of activity of their own in which the 
people of each can develop and articulate itself in a process 
of political will-formation which it legitimates and controls, 
in order thus to give legal expression to what binds the 
people together (to a greater or lesser degree of homogeneity) 
spiritually, socially and politically.9
So the right to political participation is directed to a 
collective ‘will-formation’, which gives expression to ‘what 
binds the people together’. #is is the core, as I see it, of 
a collective theory of democracy, whereby the agent of 
democracy is a supposedly single ‘we’.
Other theorists of democracy have used a far less radical 
account of collective empowerment, according to which the 
self-expression of the public is not a guiding principle of 
democracy, but only one of its methods. John Dewey wrote 
a well-known essay on the idea of the public advocating 
democratic experimentalism and warned that the ‘the wrong 
place to look [for the public] is in the realm of alleged 
causal agency, of authorship, of forces which are supposed 
to produce a state by an intrinsic vis genetrix [originating 
power]’.10 Popular sovereignty is for modern theories an 
institutional ideal, not a causal phenomenon. 
7 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory 275.
8 See for example J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? 
Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision 1 European Law 
Journal (1995) 219-258.
9 Manfred Brunner and Others v The European Union Treaty, 2 BvR 
2134/92 & 2159/92, Federal Constitutional Court, 12 October 1993, 
[1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, at 88.
10 John Dewey, The Public and its Problems in John Dewey, The Later 
Works 1925-1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston,  volume 2 (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press,1984 ; originally published 1927) 289.
Jürgen Habermas has written that ‘the source of all 
legitimacy lies in the democratic law-making process, and 
this in turn calls on the principle of popular sovereignty’.11 
Most political philosophers consider the collective context 
of democracy a means to other ends. #e best known 
defender of the ethical dimensions of nationality, the 
Oxford philosopher David Miller, argues that national 
self-determination is not a collective end but just the best 
means for achieving equality and social justice for every 
individual member of a political community. For Miller 
nations provide the trust and deliberative context that can 
make democracy succeed.12 He writes that deliberation 
requires trust among those doing the deliberating so that 
any compromise does not seem just ‘a sign of weakness’.13 
#is and other similar approaches to the relevance of 
nationality and identi"cation with a group see collective self-
government as one of the necessary means of democracy, not 
its essence.14  In short, most theorists of democracy reject 
collectivism. #ey are rights-based or egalitarian theories and 
can be divided into procedural and substantive.  
 
Democracy as Egalitarian Procedure 
#e procedural egalitarian view concentrates on the value 
of a fair procedure for participation in deliberation and 
decision-making. Some of the variations of this view are 
more strongly procedural whereas others concentrate on 
the right to vote as an aspect of equal standing.15 In the 
best known defence of this view Jeremy Waldron has 
argued that the individual right to participate entails that 
majoritarian procedures of deliberation and decision-
making should be available regarding all important political 
decisions, including matters of constitutional signi"cance. 
For Waldron, the point of democracy is that the possibility 
11  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. by William Rehg 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) 89.
12  David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
81-118. 
13  Miller, On Nationality, p. 97.
14  Henry Richardson also writes that ‘civic integrity and civic magnanimity 
are virtues that are practically necessary for [policy] discussion to 
progress towards a mutual acceptance of conclusions about what 
we ought to do and hence are necessary to motivate involvement in 
public discussion’; Henry S. Richardson,  Democratic Autonomy: Public 
Reasoning about the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) 188.
15  For this terminology see the excellent essay by Richard Bellamy, 
‘Introduction’ in Bellamy (ed.), Constitutionalism and Democracy 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
7of successful self-government requires accommodating our 
disagreements about how to go about governing in a just 
way. We must o!er grounds to each other for tolerating 
the fact that occasionally our views lose out. Belief in equal 
rights requires that we adopt procedures for settling political 
disagreements which do not themselves specify what the 
outcome is to be.16  
 
Democracy as Substantive Equality 
For Dworkin, by contrast, democracy is continuous with 
our deeper moral duties to treat each other with equal 
concern and respect. Democracy entails the protection of 
rights even when this goes against the wishes of the majority. 
He contrasts this view to the ‘majoritarian’ conception of 
democracy, a term by which he seems to include both the 
collective conception I presented at (a) and the procedural 
view I outlined in (b). #e constitutional conception of 
democracy by contrast speaks of equality as the de"ning 
value of democracy. For this view political equality is not a 
matter of the shares of political power that each one of us 
has, because that depends on contingent matters of how we 
divide on particular issues. #at some of us, for example 
communists in the United States, have no share whatsoever 
in power because they are so few of them around does not 
mean that that the system that makes them powerless is 
illegitimate. #ey are defeated, but their defeat does not 
deny them respect. For Dworkin, democracy ‘con"rms in 
the most dramatic way the equal concern and respect that 
the community together, as the custodian of coercive power, 
has for each of its members’. 17    
#e three views, the collective view of democracy, the 
procedural egalitarian and the substantive egalitarian 
theories are the leading theories of democracy today. #is 
is not the place for me to argue for the merits of one or 
the other.18  My task is simpler. I wish to argue that our 
puzzles about democracy in the European Union have their 
origin in precisely the disagreements between these three 
philosophical views about democracy.  
16 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). See also Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A 
Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
17 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2011) 390.
18 I have offered a defence of a substantive egalitarian theory of rights in 
Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Legal Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008).
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Egalitarian theories of democracy provide the most fruitful 
way of assessing the question of the EU.  For such theories 
democracy is an individual and not a collective entitlement. 
It signi"es rights to a certain equal political procedure or 
participation as argued by Waldron or to a fuller range 
of substantive equality as argued by Dworkin. #e great 
advantage of these theories is that they do not draw a stark 
distinction between domestic and international institutions. 
It is clear that international institutions can respect equality 
as well or even better than domestic ones. 
Democracy, the egalitarian theories argue, requires a political 
community which is committed to deliberation and treats all 
its members as worthy of equal respect both in its procedures 
and in its outcomes. #e European Union is not a political 
community in this sense. It is a union of peoples who 
themselves are organised in representative democracies and 
whose institutions enjoy legitimacy within the institutional 
architecture of the union itself. A union of peoples can 
promote democratic equality without at the same time 
aiming to become a democracy. 
We need here to distinguish between mechanisms of 
representation and mechanisms of accountability. #e 
"rst operate in advance of decision-making, for example 
making sure that the exercise of decision-making power is 
allocated to those with the appropriate standing. Elections 
of members of parliament or of a president play that role in 
all Western democracies. #e mechanisms of accountability, 
on the other hand, operate in a di!erent way. #ey provide 
for techniques of retrospective evaluation after a decision has 
been reached.  
#e distinction between representation and accountability 
helps us understand the di!erence between procedural 
theories and substantive theories. Procedural theories put 
their emphasis on representation. #ey demand equality 
primarily in the procedures by which the decision making 
body comes about. Substantive theories, by contrast, put the 
emphasis elsewhere. #ey consider equality in representation 
to be as important as equality in accountability. #ey impose 
additional egalitarian standards on the outcome of the 
decisions of parliaments and elected presidents. #ey need 
this as an ex post facto test of the democratic standing of any 
decision reached by the correct procedure and as a guarantee 
that the rights of minorities will not be violated. In a way, 
for substantive theories, procedure is not enough. 
How does a more sophisticated view of egalitarian 
democracy help us understand the European Union? 
I believe that the EU respects both representation and 
8accountability, but it does so as a union of peoples not 
as a state. #e key here is to understand that the treaties 
assume that the task of representation is largely domestic. 
Representation in the EU is respected indirectly, "rst, 
in the way that governments are held to represent their 
peoples in the Council, second in their role in drafting 
the amendment of the treaties and third in the process 
of appointing the Commission and the Court of Justice. 
It is respected, moreover, directly in the direct election 
of the European Parliament. It is obvious, however, 
that the European Parliament is not the main focus of 
representation. It does not enjoy full legislative powers 
like domestic parliaments, but shares its powers with the 
Commission and the Council. Moreover, it is not elected 
according to a test of population, but allows smaller states 
to be overrepresented. 
In the Eurozone the situation is somewhat more 
complex. A great deal of legislative power belongs to the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament, but most 
of the emergency measures were decided by the informal 
group of the Eurozone "nance ministers, the ‘Eurogroup’. 
#e member states are also powerful in the Governing 
Council of the recently created European Stability 
Mechanism. #e European Central Bank is obviously 
independent of all these other decision-makers. Does the 
Eurozone respect the principle of representation when it 
acts in these complex ways? I believe that it does, partly. 
Both in EU policies as a whole and in the Eurozone in 
particular, representation is achieved through domestic 
institutions. #e missing element from representation 
in the Eurozone is the role of national parliaments and 
especially of the opposition to the government, which 
ought to have a way of questioning the decisions of the 
twenty seven governments as a whole.
#e most distinctive way in which the European Union 
respects democratic equality concerns accountability. We 
should follow here Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane, for 
whom international institutions must respond to tests of 
accountability appropriate to their origins and functions, 
without seeking to imitate domestic democracy.19   #ey 
de"ne accountability as meaning that ‘some actors have 
the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge 
whether they have ful"lled their responsibilities in light of 
these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine 
that these responsibilities have not been met’.20 Grant and 
19 Ruth Grant and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of 
Power in World Politics’ 99 American Political Science Review (2005) 
29-43.
20 Grant and Keohane, ‘Accountability’ 29.
Keohane make the important point that accountability 
mechanisms can take di!erent forms that even tough do 
not constitute principles of democracy, may be taken to 
principles compatible with democratic accountability. 
#ese include including less political forms such as 
‘reputational’ and ‘market ‘accountability’. For the more 
political kinds of accountability, however, they distinguish 
between "ve types, namely ‘hierarchical’, ‘supervisory’, 
‘legal’, ‘"scal’ and ‘peer’ accountability. #e "rst two do 
not apply to the EU. #e last three, however, do. 
#e institutional framework of the European Union 
provides some important opportunities for both 
representation and accountability. Is this su%cient for 
democratic legitimacy of the EU and the Eurozone? Only 
a detailed assessment can provide a complete answer. 
Nevertheless, I hope that I have shown that it is not 
impossible for the EU to satisfy the tests of democracy. 
#e tests we need to apply in order to answer the question 
are not the unreasonable ones of a collective view of 
democracy nor the unwarranted tests of a complete 
egalitarian democracy as they apply to the domestic case. 
#e EU is a union of peoples and needs to be assessed 
both collectively as an international project and separately 
as a union of distinct democracies.  Distinguishing 
representation and accountability is the key. 
9Much has been written in the past years on the Eurozone 
crisis and how it has acutely intensi"ed already glaring 
concerns about the democratic legitimacy of the European 
Union. What I want to argue in the following is that we 
need to examine the &aws of the EU’s political system – in 
particular the lack of a real executive at EU level–together 
with the social damage that the Euro crisis has wrought. I 
proceed by detailing 6 key factors in this conjunction. 
#e European Central Bank (ECB) as Europe’s 
“sovereign”. 
Few would these days deny the &aws and institutional 
weaknesses of the European polity system, which we usually 
describe as the EU’s “democratic de"cit”. Indeed, the 
problem is no longer, as Angela Merkel put it prominently 
at the beginning of the Eurocrisis, that “if the Euro fails, 
Europe fails”. Today’s question is rather that “if the Euro 
stays as it is, European democracy may fail”. We are 
already well under way to seeing political systems in the 
European South under strain and in a process of political 
fragmentation and disarray. If one takes Carl Schmitt’s 
de"nition of sovereignty (“sovereign is he who decides on 
the exception”), then today’s sovereign, as we have seen on 
6 September 2012, when ECB president Draghi signalled 
his resolve to save the Euro at all costs, is the ECB. And this 
cannot be. 
#e EU’s governance dilemma. 
#e problem today is also that we "nd ourselves in a 
catch-22: the more the stakes rise, the more unlikely any 
signi"cant action becomes. #e political system of the 
EU simply cannot deliver – or deliver quickly enough – 
the solutions we need, such as a full banking union or a 
common deposit scheme, let alone a redemption fund 
or even Eurobonds to stabilize the system. #is is either 
because of legal problems, because of the political economy 
of national elections (especially in Germany), or because of 
the risk of referenda and the impossibility of implementing 
yet another treaty change. So Europe has been living – for 
far too long already – in a suboptimal political structure (to 
say the least). Governance means essentially ownership for 
everybody and responsibility for nobody. 
#e political fallacy of economic governance. 
Similarly, it is rather silly that we insist on talking about 
“economic governance” or “economic government” – as 
if other aspects of government (e.g. education or defence 
policy) could be separated from “economic government”. 
All policy is budget-relevant – and thus cannot be separated 
from “economic government”. Government is about 
deciding on and implementing the preferential choices of 
a society, about how the community’s pooled resources are 
distributed. All government is thus economic. Why then are 
we are trapping ourselves in such a discussion at EU level? 
Because we do not wish to confront the idea that in order 
to build a European democracy around the Eurozone, in 
order to build a system with legitimacy and accountability, 
we need to improve the res publica character of the EU (or 
at least of Euroland), meaning the common exercise of 
sovereign rights.
A new take on an old debate. 
#erefore, the new fault line of discussion should be how we 
can construct a European democracy, which would comply 
with Montesquieu’s principle of the separation of powers. 
One which o!ers a clear division between the executive and 
legislative branches, rather than the current opaque sui-
generis system of the EU, where the Council is both – and 
non-transparent to boot. In this respect, I would argue that 
the dichotomy between federalism or supranationalism 
on the one hand and intergovernmentalism on the other 
is rapidly becoming an old European dichotomy. #e 
new dichotomy is one of parlamentarism vs. executivism, 
and it will be above all a cultural issue between France 
and Germany, given their very di!erent democratic and 
historical traditions. In this new thinking, the question is 
no longer whether the European Parliament (EP) is “more” 
important than national parliaments (NPS). Rather, it is 
whether both EP and NPs will exert “crossed sovereignty” 
(voting in whatever additive system together) and thus 
control an executive body, rather than "ght against each 
other for competencies. In Germany, this discussion starts 
to emerge under the terminology of “transnational”, that 
is, as a network of national parliaments being involved in 
European decision-making.
Transnational solidarity. 
Finally, let’s look at the social aspects and our need for 
European solidarity and transfers. #e EU, or more precisely 
‘Euroland’, needs a new social contract. #ere have been 
ample analyses of the economic &aws of the Euro-system, 
which brought us into the social and populist mess we are 
currently in, but I do not have the space to go into this here. 
What is however very important to understand is that we 
have also been trapped in biased “national” discourses about 
SOLIDARITY, DEMOCRACY AND THE EUROCRISIS
Ulrike Guérot
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the origins of the crisis. #e Germans feel – wrongly – that 
they have become victims: received opinion has it that the 
German taxpayer is paying for everyone else. #e southern 
member states however also see themselves as victims, 
in this case at the hands of German-imposed austerity. 
#e truth of course is rather more complex than either 
claim. Precisely because everybody used and abused the 
&aws of the Euro-system for their own bene"t, everybody 
had a “party”: the European South had a spending party 
and Germany had an export party. We need to remind 
ourselves of this and tell a shared story about how we 
got into this crisis, in order to move out of it together, 
too. Nobody wins a blame-game. Also, we cannot repeat 
often enough that we had a banking crisis before we had 
a Euro-crisis. We needed to decide transnationally (within 
Euroland) who pays what for the crisis. Unfortunately, of 
course, instead of deciding that it would be the rich and 
the capital, the system so far has essentially made the poor, 
the labourers, the taxpayers and the young pay. And rather 
than focus on these factors, we have allowed a chauvinist 
discussion about” who pays” to dominate public discourse. 
#e wealthy Germans pay for the poor Greek, we hear, 
rather than considering that the German low-wage worker 
is as touched by the crisis as is the Greek harbour worker; 
that the German export industry has not paid its fair share, 
and neither have Greek ship owners. #e real question is 
therefore whether the European system will eventually be 
able to galvanize a form of transnational solidarity based 
on political choices rather than along national borders.
One possible scenario for achieving such a re-"gured 
transnational solidarity is to launch a European 
unemployment insurance, which would also have the 
advantage of being citizen-based. Part of the social transfer 
would then over time no longer be negotiated mainly 
through the EU’s budget. It might thus well increase 
identi"cation with Europe, in the sense of Sloterdijk’s 
“Welfare-Patriotism”. Furthermore, we need to understand 
that within a currency union, it is no longer appropriate to 
make national economies compete one against each other: 
that every country should develop a growth, let alone 
an export strategy. Rather, it would be wise to consider 
Euroland as one aggregated economy, in which we could 
distinguish between growth regions and structurally weak 
regions. #en one would realize that Germany is not all 
about economic might, but that it too has structurally 
weak regions. Distribution would need to be conceived 
rather as taking place from region to region, most likely 
from urban areas to rural areas (which is the new meta-
trend anyway) or from centre to periphery. One would not 
expect to build “#yssen-Siemens-Krupp” on the Greek 
Islands or chemical industry in the Ardèche. Rather, such 
a model would presuppose that the money &owed from 
the wealthier to the less well-o! parts of Euroland. Funds 
would not, in other words, go through a national matrix. 
 
#e benign hegemon. Or: hegemony always 
comes together with generosity
Instead, such a model would precisely imply a “transfer” 
union, or what I prefer to call a “solidarity” union. And 
the solely decisive question is: will Germany accept it? #e 
answer is di%cult and the political economy of Germany 
problematic. However, if – and as – Germany has decided 
not to give up the Euro, it will, slowly but surely have to 
accept a move towards a solidarity union thus conceived. It 
is the German rendezvous with history. In the Kindelberg 
de"nition, a hegemon is a country that cares about 
the others even if costs are engaged. If Germany is the 
accidental hegemon of Europa after this Eurocrisis, the 
next step of Eurocrisis management will essentially need to 
prove that Germany is ready to become more generous – 
and ready to think more strategically. While transnational 
solidarity can obviously be conditioned, Germany cannot 
remain a wealthy island in the middle of the European 
continent, as the German crisis management based on 
austerity would probably back"re at some point. In a way, 
a more “German Europe” – extending the German rules-
based approach of sound "scal policies or socio-economic 
softpower such as vocational training – is possible 
and probably culturally acceptable for most European 
countries, under the proviso that social and economic 
ownership is provided for all.
#e crux for the German discourse is to tell German 
citizens belatedly that they have largely bene"ted not only 
from the Single Market and the Euro, but from the Euro-
crisis itself, e.g. though negative interests rates for German 
bonds. And that much is at stake if Germany does not lead 
the Euro-related policies – including full banking union – 
vigorously to completion – and does so soon.
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OF BREAD, GAMES AND GLADIATORS
Why magic bullets will not placate EU citizens and why we should nurture a 
European demoicracy instead 
Kalypso Nicolaidis
Perhaps it is not surprising to see a political community 
cling on to survival strategies when going through 
something everyone calls an “existential” crisis. European 
politicians have been lined up to save the Euro, and 
sacri"ced on its altar in national elections for the last four 
years. #eir experts have helped them come up with an array 
of worthy and appropriate “solutions” to the crisis that will 
most likely ensure the survival of the beast. 
But in the process, they have created what could be seen 
as a worrying EU legitimacy slippage: European citizens 
not only question the policies followed in its name - the 
doing side - but increasingly question, as a result, the 
worthiness of the EU itself - the being side. Substantial 
minorities in various states want to leave the EU (or at least 
the Eurozone), while majorities believe that they do not 
bene"t from membership (Eurobarometer, October 2013). 
Even with strong di!erences between North and South, or 
creditor and debtor countries, disenchantment reigns across 
the continent in various shades of grey. #e rise of so-called 
populist Eurosceptic movements in the EU is only the tip of 
the melting legitimacy iceberg. At the very same time, the 
EU is set to centralise more functions and thus attract yet 
more opprobrium.
So what is to be done to reverse the downward legitimacy 
trend? Everyone seems to agree that in such situations, there 
are no magic bullets. And yet, too many in Europe today 
speak and act as if there were. Granted, today’s version 
of bread and circus has little to do with the frivolity that 
characterized the Roman Republic prior to its decline, the 
mere satisfaction of the immediate, shallow requirements 
of a populace o!ered as palliative for the real thing: a 
polity that works for all and where civic virtues are valued 
enough to provide a shield against arbitrary rule and corrupt 
rulers. Nevertheless, there are grounds for scepticism when 
contemplating the three broad categories of remedies usually 
o!ered to bolster EU legitimacy: 
Bread
Fair enough. When all this new centralisation will have 
helped Euro-trains run on time again, the EU is likely to 
see approval recover. If European leaders manage to save 
the Euro and restore the conditions for growth across the 
EU, much will be forgiven and analysts will hail the return 
of output legitimacy. But more immediate and super"cial 
means of appeasement of the masses are unlikely to be an 
e!ective diversion from the pain of unemployment and 
disenfranchisement. And even if and when better times 
come, understandings and expectations will have changed 
in a post-crisis EU. As the EU’s global relative decline will 
have become clear, publics will not be satis"ed with bread 
alone and will increasingly raise the di%cult distributional 
questions brought into the open by the prevailing “rescue” 
discourse which has permeated the crisis.  Moreover, because 
the legitimacy of a polity is precisely meant to carry it 
through the bad times as well as the good – legitimacy takes 
care of itself on a full stomach – the loss of public trust 
in the EU matters for the long run. It is clearer than ever 
that the EU should be such that its being or raison d’etre is 
not questioned when its doing is.  Whatever the transitory 
technical features of Euro-remedies (such as mutual "scal 
interference), renewed demands for “local solutions” as 
permanent features of the polity need to be taken seriously. 
(Menon, 2008, Nicolaidis, 2013, Scharpf, 2009)
 
Games
A second category of remedies has to do with the o!er of 
better, more transparent and participatory political games 
at the EU level to mirror its radical increase in economic 
competences linked to Eurocrisis management. Audiences 
are o!ered better advertised and bigger arenas, EU 
institutions will rent bigger and better billboards to explain, 
showcase or communicate Europe, while more European 
politics will become more transparent, in particular through 
the internet. It may be the case that revamped games will 
deliver some shallow input legitimacy to the EU, but is the 
EU’s democratic ambition to compete with its member-
states’ démocratie du spectacle? Could the EU be more 
responsive to the crowds’ thumbs up or down? And beyond, 
do we believe that such games, however entertaining (and it 
would be a stretch to say that the EU’s are), give citizens a 
sense of control and ownership over political choices?
 
Gladiators
Ultimately however, we are told that politics requires "ghts 
and faces. Indeed, “leadership”, and better still, leadership 
contests, serve as the mother of all magic bullets in times 
of crisis. And thus we have seen much of the attention to 
addressing the EU’s legitimacy crisis channelled towards 
providing recognisable “EU faces” for EU citizens. Since 
the EU Commission has acquired signi"cant powers 
to intervene in the budgetary powers of member states, 
we are further told it needs to have its President elected 
democratically, which means through the European 
Parliament and accountable to it. Many assumptions feed 
this reasoning. One "rst is that EU citizens care about the 
president of the Commission. Another is that a European 
body politic exists such that a “majority of Europeans” 
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means something – especially if this majority is drawn from 
a very low participation rate. Another yet is that a procedure 
can be devised whereby this electorate, whatever it might be, 
will really have a sense that they elected the said president. 
But what if the party with the most votes among European 
political families does not garner majority support in 
parliament? What if, conversely, majority support can only 
be obtained for someone who comes from a smaller party, 
or worse: has not even campaigned directly? Ultimately, the 
cult of providential leadership (which includes that of the 
founding fathers) will lead to short term hype at best, but it 
is hard to see how it could anchor the sense of accountability 
of European peoples.
To explain why European elites seem to hang on to the bread 
and circus approach to European legitimacy nevertheless is 
a long story. In a recent book illuminating the interwoven 
rationales provided since the 1950s to legitimise the EU 
project, Claudia Schrag Sternberg convincingly recounts 
how the mainstream legitimation strategy of EU leaders 
has always rested on the belief in the twin power of law 
and techne, which they had the sole power to interpret and 
"ne-tune in bringing the continent together. #is belief 
therefore was a way of operationalizing what Weiler refers 
to as European elites’ messianism, a sense that, given the 
mission they were entrusted to accomplish – unify Europe – 
the end justi"ed the means, including if the means rested on 
a contempt for popular expression of concern, condemned 
under the label of “populism.” 
But there is, of course, a counter-narrative, one which 
stresses a democratically grounded alternative to elite 
messianism whereby EU legitimacy is to be extracted from 
the amalgam of national politics. In this view the bread, 
games and gladiators response to the EU legitimacy challenge 
may help to some extent some of the time, but fails to 
address the core democracy challenge in Europe which rests 
at the national level. 
Unfortunately, this counter-narrative has all too often relied 
on its own populist gimmick, by cultivating the concerns 
of the average man-in-the-street but without any counter-
demanding call for citizens to own up to their citizenship (or 
old fashioned civic duties) in the multi-centered polity that 
is the EU. #us, while it is indeed "ne and proper to stress 
the crucial role of national democratic politics in upholding 
EU legitimacy, this is not to be equated with a blanket call 
for democratic sovereignty.
Arguably, before the crisis, the EU was increasingly 
akin to what Richard Bellamy calls republican 
intergovernmentalism, i.e. a transnational polity dedicated 
to the rescue of the democratic nation state and resting 
on the separate legitimacy and integrity as its component 
national democracies. Similarly, we can refer to the EU as 
a demoi-cracy, “a union of peoples who govern together 
but not as one” (Nicolaidis, 2004, 2013; see also Cheneval 
and Schimmelfennig 2013), or what others have explored 
as transnational democracy (Bohman) and multilateral 
democracy (Cheneval). #ere are two relevant mirroring 
stories here: the one about how the nation-states of Europe 
progressively became member states (Bickerton); the other 
about how the EU’s centre of power progressively became 
reinvested by these member states against the resistance of 
what Luuk van Middelaar refers to in his vivid narrative 
as the EU’s inner sphere keen on insulating itself from the 
messy web of democratic legitimacy (van Middelaar, 2013).  
#ere are no magic bullets to the legitimacy challenge ailing 
the EU. #e (mis)management of the monetary union 
has exposed the fault-lines of Europe’s demoicracy in the 
making, revealing probably more deeply than in previous 
crises the potential and limits of this demoicratic model. 
Instead of bread, games and gladiators, the progressive 
recovery of its demoicratic ethos is a more promising, albeit 
less spectacular remedy. #is means, to start with, that 
EU leaders ought to keenly respect and enforce a “do no 
harm” principle with regards to national democratic self-
government, and test all interventions in domestic arena 
against it (Chalmers, 2013). It means that EU citizens must 
make present their concerns in the governance process of 
the EU through more sophisticated modes of representation 
and accountability (see inter alia Duchesne et al, Bellamy 
and Kröger, 2013). And that the management of not only 
economic but also democratic interdependence must be at the 
heart of Europe’s new post-crisis politics.
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THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE EU: IS FEDERALISM 
THE SOLUTION OR THE PROBLEM? 
Francis Cheneval 
The democratic deficit of the EU is not at the origin 
of the so-called Euro-crisis
In present times, the assessment of the democratic legitimacy 
of the EU is heavily in&uenced by the so-called Euro-crisis. 
But one should be clear about the fact that Europe’s "nancial 
and "scal problems was not triggered by the democratic 
de"cit of the EU or Euro area, whatever democratic de"cit 
there may be. #e crisis has its origins in the US “housing 
bubble” that essentially consisted in a proliferation of bad 
loans that were “securitized” in dubious "nancial products 
and widely traded over the counter, i.e. with total lack of 
transparency and traceability. #e "nancial institutions 
involved in this practice of "nancial metaphysics were 
interdependent global "rms whose risk management got out 
of control because traders and management were seduced 
by astronomic short-term gains. As the dire consequences 
of these practices started to take e!ect many "nancial 
institutions quickly approached bankruptcy. Several of them 
where judged systemically relevant or “too big to fail” and 
therefore bailed out with public money.  In countries with 
low levels of economic performance this quickly led to a 
"scal crisis. So it happened in many countries within and 
without the EU and Euro area. Excessive public debt is by 
no means a speci"c trait of southern Euro area member 
countries. Additionally, in some member countries of the 
Euro area there were already high levels of public debt and 
also growing real estate bubbles heavily weighing on the 
balances sheets of unhealthy "nancial institutions. #is 
situation coincided with the external shocks to the banking 
system from abroad. #e internal problems of many 
southern European countries were and probably still are 
related to corruptive and irresponsible practices of allocation 
of public funds on the local and national levels. At the same 
time these countries’ dysfunctional regulatory systems and 
ine%cient bureaucracies impede entrepreneurial activity.
In sum, none of these aspects of the crisis are related to the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Union or Eurozone. 
The common currency is responsible for the lack of 
options of member states to respond to the financial 
crisis, but the impeded options, most importantly 
devaluation, should not be seen as the most efficient 
solution to the crisis
Arguably, the structural characteristics and legal framework 
of the Euro area limit the options of di!erent member 
countries and the ECB to respond to the crisis. One 
solution, made impossible by the common currency, 
is the devaluation of the national currency in order to 
enhance competitiveness. #is presumed solution is not at 
hand for member countries unless they exit the common 
currency. Individual exit of the common currency is not 
a legal option nor is it factually possible due to imminent 
danger of collapse of the banking system, hyperin&ation, 
and contagion. Be that as it may, regarding devaluation 
one should keep in mind that the structural de"ciencies 
that cause the lack of competitiveness as well as the long 
traditions of tax evasion and misallocation of public funds 
in some Euro area countries now in trouble have been 
facilitated by periodic devaluations in the pre-Euro past. 
#is has lead to constant instability in the common market 
before the introduction of the common currency. Short-
term relief by devaluation in pace with electoral cycles has 
kept some countries from facing necessary structural reforms 
to enhance long-term competitiveness and to favour long-
term perspectives of sustainable growth. So, devaluation 
should not be considered the silver bullet solution to the 
"nancial and "scal crisis of Euro area member states. On 
the other hand, the structural reforms now enforced should 
not be portrayed as reforms that could or should be avoided 
by devaluation. Devaluation without structural adaptation 
is not a sustainable solution to the problem of lacking 
economic competitiveness. Structural reforms should also 
not be confused with mere austerity measures that further 
depress the economies. A balance needs to be struck between 
structural reforms and "scal stimulus. One could put it this 
way: #e impossibility of devaluation "nally forces some 
countries to envisage structural reforms and to exit the 
vicious cycle of bad governance and periodic devaluation. 
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The introduction of the Euro created a “Sachzwang” 
towards centralization. That puts undue stress on a 
system whose citizens do not form an overarching 
demos 
If the structure of the EU is not the cause of the crisis and 
if the adequate responses to the crisis are not essentially 
di!erent from what is actually implemented (with arguable 
need for more stimulus, for more structural reform and 
for less austerity) then why is the "nancial crisis so widely 
perceived as a crisis of democratic legitimacy of the EU and 
the Euro-area? #e notion of demoicratic de"cit is helpful 
to understand the dynamics, i.e. the fact that institutional 
and regulatory de"cits are situated at the national level 
and impede e!ective coordination and collaboration at 
the European level (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; 
Nicolaïdis 2013). #e EU has not forced the Euro on any 
member country. Each member country was free to adopt 
the Euro according to its own procedures. Some countries 
organized public votes in which the introduction of the 
Euro was rejected (Sweden, Denmark), others rejected it in 
parliament (UK). No country can devolve the responsibility 
for being in the Euro area to Brussels or Berlin. #e 
responsibility is "rst and foremost located at the national 
level of each member state. However, in most countries the 
introduction of the Euro was totally or almost uniquely 
government-driven and carried through by the elites as if 
its introduction had been just another technical measure 
of the common market. #e perception of the crisis as a 
crisis of democratic legitimacy of the EU is, in my view, 
due to a dangerous mix of lack of citizen involvement 
regarding European policies at the national levels combined 
with enhanced intergovernmental centralism in the actual 
European crisis management. Both realities testify to the 
demoicratic de"cit of the EU, i.e. insu%cient democratic 
control of European a!airs on the national level and lack of 
e!ective interlinking of national demoi and citizens in the 
management of European a!airs. 
#e introduction of the Euro arguably created a 
“Sachzwang” toward political centralization. #e “united 
debts of Europe” call for the “united states of Europe”. Mere 
coordination of national "scal policies cast in a stability pact 
is di%cult if not impossible due to the great imbalances 
between the economies. #e Euro area therefore needs a 
bank union, a "scal union, and ultimately a full-&edged 
political union. #e introduction of the Euro was in fact 
the true, but hidden constitutional moment of the EU. 
#e more enlightened elite probably thought the Euro 
was a “cunning of history” that would sleepwalk European 
consumers into political Union. #is was a highly risky 
undertaking. #e inescapable centralizing consequences of 
a common currency were not clearly laid out to citizens, 
nor did the overwhelming majority of demoi as pouvoirs 
constituants have a chance to endorse or reject the transfer 
of sovereignty that the introduction of the Euro implied. 
No wonder that citizens now perceive the Euro and the 
measures of the Euro-crisis management as imposed. Had 
every people voted on the introduction of the Euro and 
had only those countries whose citizens approved the 
Euro introduced it, a procedure that would have triggered 
intense public debate on the implications of this measure, 
the citizens of the countries part of the Euro area would 
not perceive the crisis as an outcome others have in&icted 
on them. #e measures of the crisis management could 
not be seen as authoritarian and as something for which 
citizens carry no responsibility. Maybe in such a scenario 
the Euro would not have been introduced so swiftly and 
not by so many countries. But any of the possible outcomes 
would rest on a sustainable base of demoicratic legitimacy. 
#e architects of the Euro thought that the lack of input-
legitimacy of the Euro would be compensated by output 
legitimacy of economic growth, stability and prosperity. One 
has to evaluate this strategy by its opposite scenario. While 
under conditions of strong economic growth a democratic 
de"cit may be compensated by output legitimacy, under 
opposite conditions, highly probable given the volatile 
nature of economic activity, the legitimacy is further and 
dangerously undermined. #is is what is now taking place. 
#e economic crisis undermines the political legitimacy of 
the EU and Euro area in a disproportionate manner. #e 
crisis, the night in which all cats are black, overshadows all 
the good that the EU also does and signi"es. #at is why 
such far-reaching devolution of state power as the creation of 
a common currency needs to be given a political foundation 
ex ante via procedures of citizen participation in each 
participating demos. Negative economic consequences need 
to be perceived by the citizens as consequences of their own 
action or participation in governmental choices. Only under 
such circumstances do the frequent and inevitable economic 
problems of any system not undermine the fundamental 
institutional stability of a polity.   
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The federal state is not the solution to the current 
economic and democratic crisis of the Euro area. 
In the more immediate future, the consolidation 
of European democracy needs to be anchored in 
the national demoi who need to regain more of a 
say regarding their country’s role in the EU and 
regarding the fundamental rules of the EU.
For the moment, federal political union is not really on 
the agenda. Rather, the crisis management consists of 
intergovernmental centralism and “functionalism as usual” 
under the lead of Germany. In these circumstances, the 
management of the currency area creates the danger of a 
backlash towards nationalism and protectionism in member 
countries. But the idea that the federal state is the solution 
to the economic crisis as well as to the crisis of democratic 
legitimacy is also questionable or in need of di!erentiation. 
Regarding the economic crisis one should keep in mind 
that many over-indebted countries are centralistic or federal 
states, starting with Japan and the USA who continue 
to march on the brink of "scal collapse. Even if the EU 
transforms into a federal state this will not eo ipso represent a 
solution to the debt crisis unless accompanied by structural 
reforms in the member states and by sound "scal and 
economic policies of the EU. Problems of excessive public 
debt are solved by adequate economic policies in the 
respective polity. #e polity might be a village, province, 
centralized nation-state, federal state, or multilateral 
organization. #ere is no inherent feature of the state 
that keeps it out of economic troubles independently of 
good economic governance. If there is a structural feature 
that keeps state budgets balanced it is the referendum or 
constitutionalized conditional debt-limits, practiced in 
Switzerland and its member Cantons and increasingly 
copied by others. On the other hand, polity structures 
other than federal states can perform well if governed with 
prudence and competence. 
With regard to the democratic legitimacy it is important 
to take into account that the crisis symptoms of the Euro 
area as well as many other data regarding the EU and its 
member states indicate that European citizens do not form 
an overarching European demos. So the &ight forward into 
a federal state is not viable in a timespan short enough to 
solve the current crisis. It would increase the risk of backlash 
and trigger even more nationalistic reactions. In the more 
immediate future, the consolidation of European democracy 
needs to be anchored in the national demoi who need to 
regain more of a say regarding their countries basic role in 
the EU and regarding the fundamental rules of the EU. 
Trust needs to be reinstalled into European integration from 
below by direct citizen involvement on the national level 
in the construction of the fundamental rules of the EU. If 
these procedures are embedded in rules that are harmonized 
and coordinated at the European level, they will enhance 
European public debate and hinder nationalistic regressions 
as people realize that they decide upon matters in which 
they are interconnected and interdependent (Cheneval 
2007). Open-ended integration will serve the EU better 
than enforced centralization or enforced “solidarity”. #ere 
needs to be a let go of substantive “apriori” of European 
integration, such as “ever closer union”, in favour of citizen 
choice. Only under circumstances of real options within a 
spectrum of more or less European integration will citizens 
redevelop trust in the EU and a well-informed realistic 
assessment of the importance of the EU. #e process of 
European integration needs to be more directly connected 
to citizens’ choices of constitutional rules, whatever those 
choices may be as long as they do not contradict human 
rights. #is is in the interest of European integration because 
only a sense of freedom toward European integration 
will bring trust to go further and deeper in European 
integration. Further down the road, with many more lessons 
learned and on the basis of bottom-up political processes 
originating in the member demoi, eventually a federal union 
could be voted on directly in all member states and it then 
should be adopted only by member-demoi whose citizens 
voted in favour.
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THE EURODIVIDEND
Philippe Van Parijs
Criticizing is easy. Making proposals is harder. Here is one, 
simple and radical, yet — I shall argue — reasonable and 
urgent.
Eurodividend is how I shall call it. It consists in paying a 
modest basic income to every legal resident of the European 
Union, or at least of the subset of member states that 
either have adopted the euro or are committed to doing so 
soon. #is income provides each resident with a universal 
and unconditional &oor that can be supplemented at will 
by labour income, capital income and social bene"ts. Its 
level can vary from country to country to track the cost of 
living, and it can be lower for the young and higher for the 
elderly. It is to be "nanced by the Value Added Tax. To fund 
a eurodividend averaging 200 euros per month for all EU 
residents, one needs to tax the EU’s harmonized VAT base at 
a rate of about 20%, which amounts to close to 10% of the 
EU’s GDP.
Why do we need such an unprecedented scheme? For four 
reasons. #e most urgent one has to do with the crisis in the 
Eurozone. Why is it that the US have been managing for 
many decennia with a single currency despite the diversity 
of its "fty states and their divergent economic fates, whereas 
the Eurozone is in deep trouble after just one decade? From 
Milton Friedman to Amartya Sen, economists have kept 
warning us: Europe lacks two bu!ering mechanisms that 
serve in the US as powerful substitutes for exchange rate 
adjustments by individual states. 
One of them is inter-state migration. #e proportion of US 
residents who move to another state in any given period is 
about six times higher than the proportion of EU residents 
who move to another member state. Europeans may become 
somewhat more mobile. But our entrenched linguistic 
diversity imposes very strict limits on how far we can expect 
— or indeed hope — to amplify this "rst mechanism. 
Athens’ unemployed will never migrate as smoothly to 
Munich as Detroit’s to Austin.
#e dollar zone’s second powerful bu!ering mechanism 
consists of automatic inter-state transfers, essentially 
through the working of a welfare state largely organized 
and funded at the federal level. If Michigan or Missouri 
su!er economically, they do not sink into a downward 
spiral. Not only is their unemployment tempered by 
emigration. In addition, owing to tax liabilities shrinking 
and bene"t payments swelling, a growing part of their social 
expenditures is de facto funded by the rest of the country. 
Depending on the methodology used, the estimates of the 
extent of this automatic compensation vary between 20 and 
40%. In the EU, by contrast, the dampening of a member’s 
state downturn through adjustments of net transfers across 
states amounts to less than 1%. Given the poor prospects 
of the migration mechanism, the eurozone simply cannot 
a!ord to neglect this second one. What form should it take? 
We shall not nor should ever have an EU-wide mega welfare 
state. Something more modest, far rougher, more lump-sum 
and therefore more compatible with the EU’s subsidiarity 
principle, is what we need. If it is to be viable, our monetary 
union needs to equip itself with a number of new tools. 
One of them is a bu!ering mechanism which can only be 
something like a eurodividend.  
#e second reason why we need such a trans-national 
transfer scheme applies to the EU as a whole. #e linguistic 
and cultural diversity of the European continent does not 
only make inter-state migration more costly and therefore 
less likely for the individuals involved. It also reduces 
the bene"ts and increases the costs for the communities 
involved. Integration into the new environment, both 
economic and social, takes more time, requires more 
administrative and educational resources, creates more 
lasting tensions than is the case with inter-state migration 
in the US.  As migrants from poorer countries &ock into 
the more a$uent metropolitan areas, the feeling of being 
invaded by indigestible crowds feeds the drive to reinstate 
thick boundaries and repudiate both free movement and 
non-discrimination. #ere is an alternative, however: 
organize systematic transfers from the centre to the 
periphery. People will no longer need to be uprooted 
and driven away from their relatives and communities 
by the sheer need to survive. Instead, populations will be 
su%ciently stabilized to make immigration digestible in the 
magnet areas and to stop emigration being badly debilitating 
in the peripheral areas. If it is to be politically sustainable 
and socio-economically e%cient, a European Union with 
free internal migration must introduce something along the 
lines of a eurodividend.
#irdly and most fundamentally, the free movement of 
capital, human capital, goods and services across the borders 
of member states erodes the capacity of each of these to 
perform the redistributive tasks they discharged pretty well 
in the past. Member states are no longer sovereign states 
able to set democratically their priorities and to realize 
solidarity among their citizens. #ey are more and more 
compelled to behave as if they were "rms, obsessed by their 
competitiveness, anxious to attract or keep their capital 
and their human capital, eager to eradicate any social 
expenditure that cannot be sold as an investment and to 
phase out any scheme likely to attract welfare tourists and 
other unproductive folk. It is no longer democracy that 
imposes its rules on markets and uses them for its purposes. 
It is the single market that imposes its laws on democracies 
An earlier version of this  article first appeared in the Social Europe Journal, 
2 July 2013
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and forces them to give competitiveness top priority. If our 
diverse ways of organizing social solidarity are to be saved 
from the grip of "scal and social competition, part of it 
must be lifted to a higher level. #e power and diversity of 
our welfare states will not survive the murderous pressure of 
competitiveness unless the united European market operates 
on the foundation of something like a Eurodividend.
Finally, it is important for all dimensions of the functioning 
of the European Union that its decisions should be regarded 
as legitimate, so that governments and citizens will not 
feel entitled to circumvent them in all sorts of ways. One 
important factor turns on whether citizens perceive very 
tangibly that the Union does something for all of them, 
not only for the elites, for the movers, for those who are 
in a position to seize the new opportunities, but also for 
the underdogs, for those left out, for the stay-at-homes. 
Bismarck helped secure the shaky legitimacy of his uni"ed 
Germany by creating the world’s "rst public pension system. 
If the Union is to be more in people’s eyes than a heartless 
bureaucracy, if it is to be perceived as a caring Europe 
with which all can identify, it will need to "nd a way of 
bringing about something totally unprecedented: a universal 
eurodividend.
Are there any reasonable objections to this proposal? Of 
course there are. Some, for example, may question the 
wisdom using VAT to fund the scheme. True, VAT is the 
most Europeanized of all major forms of taxation. But 
would it not make more sense to use a Tobin tax or a carbon 
tax, for example? We can do so, but what these taxrs could 
fund, under pretty optimistic assumptions, is an EU-wide 
monthly eurodividend of no more than 10 and 14 euros, 
respectively. Why not the more progressive personal income 
tax then? Because the de"nition of the income tax base 
varies greatly from country to country and is highly sensitive 
politically. Moreover, today’s income tax is de facto hardly 
more progressive than VAT. When added to national rates, 
would a 20% rate of VAT not be unsustainable? It does not 
need to be added to unchanged VAT rates: the member 
states’ social expenditures can and should be adjusted 
downward and the revenues of the income tax upward as 
a straightforward implication of the sheer presence of the 
eurodividend.
Others are likely to object that each of the four functions 
listed above could be served better through some more 
complicated, more sophisticated device. Most of these 
arguments will be correct. My claim is simply that no other 
manageable mechanism would serve all four functions 
as well while being intelligible to the ordinary European 
citizen.
A more fundamental objection is that, however desirable 
the expected e!ects, it would be unfair to give everyone 
something for nothing. #is objection rests on a 
misperception. A eurodividend does not amount to an 
unfair redistribution of the fruits of some hard workers’ 
work. It rather amounts to sharing among all European 
residents, in the form of a modest basic income, part of 
the bene"ts of European integration. How much did we 
save as a result of not having to conduct or prepare war 
with our neighbours? How much did we gain as a result 
of having increased competition between our "rms or of 
having allowed factors of production to move wherever in 
Europe they are most productive? No one knows and no 
one will ever know. But what is certain is that these bene"ts 
are distributed very unequally in the European population, 
depending on whether they are movers or stay-at-homes, 
depending on whether or not the situation created by 
European integration happened to make their consumption 
cheaper or their skills more valuable. A modest eurodividend 
is simply a straightforward and e%cient way of guaranteeing 
that some of these bene"ts will reach each European in a 
tangible way.
Is this not utopian? Of course it is, in the sense in which 
the European Union itself was utopian until not so long 
ago, and also in the sense in which the social security system 
was utopian before Bismarck put together its "rst building 
blocks. But Bismarck did not create his pension system 
out of the kindness of his heart. He did so because people 
started mobilizing in favour of radical reforms across the 
whole of the Reich he was trying to unify. What are we 
waiting for? 
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FEDERALISM, PAN-EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, AND AGAINST 
ARTICLE 50: A COMMENT ON THE EU’S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
Andrew Walton
In order to consider questions surrounding European Union 
(EU) democracy and its response to di%culties such as the 
Eurozone crisis, it is useful to begin with some background 
about the normative framework for evaluating the 
institution.  One normative justi"cation for a supranational 
organisation such as the EU seems straightforward: it is a 
valuable enterprise insofar as it helps nation-states improve 
the lives of individuals within and without their borders.1  
In a globalised world, it is increasingly di%cult for nation-
states to protect and promote the rights and welfare of their 
citizens by operating alone and one of the foundational 
rationales for the EU is to enable members to pursue these 
ends better by working together.  Moreover, as we come 
to recognise an increasing amount of cross-border duties, 
it becomes useful to enhance cross-border cooperative 
structures to help us meet them.  #us, we can understand 
the existence of the EU as defensible, in part, in virtue of 
the ways it helps nation-states improve their internal and 
external legitimacy.
If these thoughts capture the normative purposes of the 
EU, it seems that there are two reasons to desire that 
it is a democratic institution.  I take democracy to be 
de"ned, minimally, as involving the equal right of subjects 
to participate in the decision-making of their common 
institutional framework with the aim of pursuing their 
common good.  In the context of the EU, this idea could 
mean either that all individuals subjected to its rules should 
have an equal vote in electing a common parliament or that 
nationally grouped units elect delegates to participate on 
their behalf at the supranational level.  #e two reasons to 
value such structures would be as follows.  First, institutions 
that are democratic in the sense described above have proven 
records in producing better policies.2   
1  For a detailed argument defending this proposition see R. Dworkin, ‘A 
New Philosophy for International Law’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
41:1 (2013), pp. 2-30.
2  This defence of democracy is commonplace, but is prominently 
defended by A. Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 160-188 and T. Christiano, ‘An Instrumental 
Argument for a Human Right to Democracy’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 39:2 (2011), pp. 142-176.
Second, they treat their subjects as moral equals by 
conveying the view that their subjects are equally respected 
as capable of exercising a sense of justice.3
#e above conveys a simple picture about the role of 
democracy within an institution with the normative 
grounding of the EU.  #is picture allows us to address the 
central question asked on this panel: in what senses might 
federalism be a good model for thinking about the EU’s 
democratic credentials in the context of the Eurozone crisis?  
To my mind, there are two lessons to be drawn.
First, federalism can o!er some guidance on the structure 
democracy should take at the EU level.  Federal systems 
are usually characterised by having a division or balance of 
power between regional and cross-regional representatives.4  
To some extent, the EU already mirrors this structure, 
with the European Parliament acting as a directly elected 
body balanced by national representatives in the European 
Council.  Yet, the former are primarily elected on nationally 
contained platforms and much politics in the EU remains 
within the prism of nationally de"ned interests.  Indeed, 
a number of crucial decisions in the EU are made by 
internal bodies, such as the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank, and reach electorates only at the 
level of rati"cation, thus restricting engagement with them 
to the national domain.  Both of these points are nicely 
demonstrated by the national prerogatives that have been so 
dominant in constructing the bailout packages, especially 
their conditionality clauses, in the Eurozone crisis.  In both 
of the respects mentioned, it appears that what is missing 
from EU structures is precisely federalism’s emphasis on 
balancing di!erent interest levels through di!erently-focused 
representatives. #ere seems some reason to believe that 
complementing the nationally-channelled bodies by, for 
example, structuring the European Parliament to have an 
electoral system of a more pan-European nature would 
encourage less nationalistic bias, more focus on common 
interests, and, as a result, more balanced and fairer policies.5  
Plenty of experience from nation-state building would 
support this hypothesis.
3  This defence of democracy is offered in J. Cohen, ‘For a Democratic 
Society’, in S. Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 86-138.
4  A. Føllesdal, ‘Federalism‘, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism  Accessed 27th 
June 2013.
5 This suggestion is made in A. Føllesdal & S. Hix, ‘Why There is a 
Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 44:3 (2006), pp. 551-556.
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Second, there is a lesson to be learned from the distinction 
between federal and confederal systems.  #e distinction 
rests, inter alia, on the basis of commitment to the union.  
Confederal systems typically grant some form of unilateral 
right to exit, whereas federal systems do not grant this 
right.6  As emphasised particularly by Article 50 of the 
Treaty of Lisbon (TL), the EU mirrors, in this respect, a 
confederal system.  It also houses a more confederal feel 
within the political system in terms of the veto rights states 
hold over treaties and policies.  But the di%culties with 
such a system are clear.  As the literature on secession has 
emphasised, a unilateral right to exit a political association 
provides a disincentive to engage sincerely in democratic 
politics (and, indeed, to pursue just policies).7  #e recent 
dialogue surrounding the Eurozone crisis provides ample 
evidence for this point.  In an attempt to keep a privileged 
place for the city of London, David Cameron has used the 
possibilities of veto and exit to bargain for deals that suit 
the interests of (some members of ) his state more than the 
wider populace of Europe.  Indeed, the same di%culties – 
rights of veto and exit – have plagued many negotiations 
in the EU, from foreign and security policy to, again, the 
structure of bailout packages.  #e results have been policy 
decisions subject to distorting bias and a symbolic statement 
that some states are more equal than others in the EU 
structure.  Taking lead from federal thought would advise 
us, I think, to remove or soften the unilateral right to exit, 
perhaps suggesting a return to the pre-TL arrangement of 
a social protocol inveighing against leaving the union.  It 
may also suggest other types of ‘lock-in’ regulations, such as 
adopting a system like the World Trade Organisation’s single 
undertaking clause, requiring that all actors are bound by 
the same regulations and not able to opt in and out as they 
please.  #ese structures would provide incentives to focus 
on the common good, engage in a more bona "de manner 
in the political process, and reach solutions bene"cial for 
all.  #ey would also manifest a better expression of member 
equality.  In these respects, there, again, seems some reason 
to believe the move towards federalism here would improve 
both the democratic credentials and the substantive output 
of the EU system.
 
6  A. Føllesdal, ‘Federalism‘, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism  Accessed 27th 
June 2013.
7  A. Buchanan, ‘Theories of Secession’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
26:1 (1997), pp. 52-55
#ese comments are likely to provoke two objections.  
First, ideas for improving the democratic nature of the 
EU will always encounter the objection that there is no 
demos beyond the nation-state level, problematizing the 
likely bene"ts we would usually expect from democratic 
structures.8  My sense here is that this objection is less 
threatening than is often thought.  Europe has a smaller 
and less diverse population than India in many ways 
and although few would argue that India’s democracy is 
perfect, it is di%cult to deny that they have something 
that genuinely resembles a demos and an appropriately 
corresponding kratos.9   Second, it might be thought that my 
suggestions, especially the second, limit state sovereignty in 
a problematic way.10  My sense here is that such a worry is 
largely overstated.  Given the principle of subsidiarity and 
some continued place for the system of quali"ed majority 
voting already in existence in the EU, the likelihood of 
even my proposals limiting sovereignty greatly is minimal.  
Nevertheless, even to the extent that the worry is genuine, 
I think that it is overridden by the point with which I 
began this text: that states subsuming themselves into 
supranational structures is justi"ed by the improvement 
in legitimacy that it grants them.  To the extent that my 
proposals would further advance this end, the restrictions 
they would impose on sovereignty – justi"ed, ultimately, by 
the legitimacy of the sovereign – seem defensible.
In conclusion, I wish to highlight that I have not argued for 
wholesale federalism or for the idea that federalism provides 
a ‘solution’ to any democratic de"cit.  But I do believe, 
and hope to have shown, that there are lessons that can be 
learnt from federalism, evidenced by experiences during the 
Eurozone crisis, regarding how we could improve both the 
democratic credentials and the ultimate legitimacy of the 
EU and its members.
8 For varieties of this objection see W. Kymlicka, Politics in the 
Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) and D. Miller, ‘Against Global 
Democracy’, in K. Breen & S. O’Neill (eds.), After the Nation 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 141-160.
9 On this point see, especially, M. Koenig-Archibugi, ‘Is Global 
Democracy Possible?’, European Journal of International Relations, 
17:3 (2011), pp. 530-531.
10 Indeed, maintaining the unilateral right to exit has been seen by some 
discussants of the European Union as a vital part of its inter-national 
structure.  See, for example, K. Nicolaïdis, ‘European Demoicracy and 
its Crisis’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51:2 (2013), pp. 362-
363.
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